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Abstract
Deliberate circumvention of information systems security is a common behavioral pattern among users. It not
only defeats the purpose of having the security controls
in place, but can also go far beyond in terms of the total
damage it can cause. An organization grappling with circumvention can try to (i) train its users, or (ii) take
on enforcement measures, or adopt a combination of
the two. In this work, we look at the trade-off between
these two very different approaches towards circumvention and try to gain some insights about how an organization might wish to tackle this menace.
Keywords: IT Security, security control, circumvention, work-around, training, monitoring.

1.

Introduction

Over the last few years, as interconnected, networked information systems have become more and
more prevalent, security and assurance of information technology (IT) have gained tremendous importance within all types of organizations. In order to
reduce the risks of security breaches, organizations
have often invested heavily in IT security. For example, the global IT security market “topped $75 billion in 2015,” and is expected to hit a whopping $170
billion by 2020 [24]. A large portion of this expenditure goes towards different types of security controls1 —controls that are supposed to reduce, or even
eliminate at times, loopholes through which hackers can gain access to a system [8]. However, despite
such heavy investments, security breaches are a common occurrence in the networked world of today.
1

Every security control is deployed with its own policy specification. For example, access authentication through userid
and password is a control, and its associated policy is essentially a definition of what makes certain strings of characters
acceptable as userid and password. Similarly site blocking is a
security control, and the actual list of blocked sites is its policy
specification. In this paper, we use the shorthand “control” to
mean both—a security control as well as its associated policy
specification.
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It turns out that a significant part of the problem
lies not with the controls themselves, but with the
human users who interact with these systems.2 Prior
research has consistently found that, in the face of a
stricter security control, users often try to bypass or
work around it, essentially diluting the ability of the
control to effectively thwart security attacks [e.g.,
2, 14, 17, 19, 20, 21]. Security circumvention—a situation where a user works around a security control,
thereby defeating its purpose, at least partially—can
take on many different forms. When a user, faced
with a stringent requirement for a complex password, writes it down on a sticky note to attach it
to the corner of his monitor—or to the back of the
keyboard for that matter—it is a case of security circumvention [21]. Similarly, when a user, faced with
a list of sites that are blocked from a company network, deliberately connects to a third-party virtual
private network (VPN) to access those very blocked
sites, it is also a case of circumvention. When a doctor, facing repeated timeouts after a period of inactivity, places a Styrofoam cup on a proximity sensor
to fool the system to think that it is still in use,
she is actually circumventing a security control [19].
And, when a nurse on duty walks away from his station, if only for a few minutes, without signing out
of the system and, hence, leaving it vulnerable, it is
certainly a case of circumvention as well. As Blythe
et al. [3] put it, security circumvention occurs any
time “users either fail to follow an intended protocol
or workflow process, or actively take steps to defeat
it.”
Why do users circumvent? While it is not possible
to pinpoint one single reason, prior field work has
identified several. First, the inconvenience caused
2

We use the term “user” in a generic sense to mean anyone
who interacts with the system. Therefore, our user could be
an end user, a developer, a tester, a security expert, or a system administrator. Irrespective of the actual category, these
human users can and do engage in activities that bypass the
intended purpose of security controls [3].
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by security controls or policies may often be the
primary motivation—the trouble of remembering a
long complex password (only with a permissible
combination of different keyboard characters) or the
frustration at having to repeatedly sign in to a system after periodic timeouts from inactivity are only
two of many such examples [21]. Second, the urgency
to engage in an activity that has been forbidden—
the need, for example, to access certain sites that
have been blocked—could also be very strong, which
might prompt the user to circumvent by, say, connecting to a “dark” VPN [10]. Third, a user may
also not be familiar with the repercussions of his own
activities, that is, he may grossly underestimate the
extent of damage posed by his actions. For example,
an employee taking a toilet break for a couple of minutes may think that leaving the system signed in for
that small time window is perhaps harmless, when,
in reality, it could pose a significant security risk.
Finally, a user may not be fully conversant with the
security policies and their ramifications; such would
be the case when an executive shares her password
with her personal assistant without realizing that it
is not only against her own company’s security policies, but now could also be a federal crime [5].
Intentional or not, circumvention can pose significant security risks to an organization [e.g., 3, 4, 14,
25]. Not only do such activities dilute the effectiveness of a control, they could also open doors to newer
attacks that were not present before the control was
put in place. Consider the case of circumventing
blocked sites using third-party VPNs. Before blocking certain sites, an organization does face certain
risks from those sites. However, if a user connects
to a third-party VPN to reach those sites after they
have been blocked from the company network, not
only do they bear the risks posed by those blocked
sites, but there is also an additional threat coming
from the VPN provider, typically an illegitimate site
posing additional risks that were not present earlier.
Given these realities, the issue of circumvention
and how to prevent it has become a critical one
for many organizations [e.g., 3, 14, 19]. Essentially, there are two approaches an organization can
take [13, 18, 25, 28]: On one hand, it can invest in
enforcement measures, that is, towards better monitoring (auditing) of user activities and penalizing
violations when detected. On the other, it can also
invest in providing sufficient training to its employees, making them aware of the current security controls and policies, as well as the ramifications of circumventing them. Both these approaches can cost
an organization significant time and effort [18]. Naturally, the following research questions emerge:

• How effective are these two approaches, and
should an organization prefer one over the other?
• If so, under what conditions should one
approach be preferable to the other?
• Do these two approaches act as substitutes or
complements of each other?
Clearly, these are important questions for any organization grappling with how to stop security threats
posed by circumvention.
To answer these questions, we set up a simple modeling experiment using constructs borrowed
from standard microeconomic models. We consider
a user base that is heterogeneous in the benefits
derived from, and costs incurred for, circumvention.
We also consider organizational losses arising out of
security loopholes as well as circumvention. A game
is setup where the organization first chooses its levels
of investment for training and enforcement. Based
on that, the users choose whether or not to circumvent. We solve for the equilibrium of this sequential
game and perform comparative statics on the cost
parameters for training and enforcement to answer
our research questions.
Our answers are interesting. We find that neither approach dominates the other one throughout. We also find that neither approach is sufficient
on its own, and a combination is usually the best
way forward. These two results, although somewhat
intuitive, provide important insights about organizational policy on circumvention. We also find that,
in a significant portion of the parameter space, these
two approaches to prevent circumvention complement each other, and curiously, their levels either
increase or decrease together as the parameters are
changed. This is surprising. Given that both the
approaches work towards the same end—prevention
of circumvention—it is natural to expect that they
would be substitutes, but we find that they could
actually be complementary.

2.

Literature

Our research overlaps with the extant literature on
the economics of information security. This literature has grown substantially in recent years. Of
particular relevance are papers that discuss issues
pertaining to investments in IT security. For example, Gordon and Loeb [11] consider the decision to
invest in security using an economic model that
weighs the cost of security against the expected
loss from attacks. In a subsequent empirical work,
Gordon and Loeb [12] make the point that such
cost-benefit analysis is quite common in practice.
Cavusoglu et al. [9] argue that a game-theoretic
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approach actually leads to a more effective security investment decision when compared to such
decision-theoretic approaches. This is because the
attackers often strategically respond to the level of
investment, which makes their activity level endogenous to the decision to invest in information security.
Herath and Herath [16] propose a real-options model
to evaluate security investment decisions. Anderson
and Moore [1] and Varian [26] look at the provision
of security from the perspectives of underlying incentives, legal liability, and network externalities. Our
main contribution to this literature is that we discuss
how investments should be targeted—should they
primarily target enforcement or should they emphasize training—in an environment in which employees
engage in circumvention of security controls.
The literature on security controls is also important. Lee et al. [22] examine the role of security standards in a context where not all security controls are
verifiable. Our focus is neither on verifiability nor
on standards. We simply focus on the consequences
of circumvention and the economic losses resulting
therefrom. As mentioned already, our motivation is
actually rooted in the long stream of research that
highlights how users often bypass and work around
security controls, in essence rendering them useless [2, 14, 17, 19, 20, 21]. According to Koppel [19],
in many cases, these circumventions have become
the norm, rather than the exception. As Heckle [15]
notes, they have become the norm so much so that
clinicians in some hospitals offer logged-in sessions
to one another as a matter of professional courtesy. Along similar lines, Blythe et al. [3] observe
that users often see circumvention as a necessary
means to get their job-related activities done, and
not because they intend anything malicious.
Although researchers have talked about circumvention being common, we could not locate substantial literature that investigates the economics of this
phenomenon and offers strategic insights. Addressing this gap is important, however, because it is well
documented in prior literature that breaches have
serious financial implications [6, 7] and that preventing circumvention can go a long way [3, 14, 19].
In order to address it, we develop a model to capture the essential elements mentioned in the NIST
handbook [13]. In particular, we borrow the idea
that both “the dissemination and the enforcement
of policy are critical issues” [13, p. 146]. Enforcement requires, among other things, auditing—users
are less likely to circumvent when they are afraid
that their actions will be recorded and audited—and
punitive actions when circumventions are detected.

Dissemination through employee training is equally
important because circumvention often arises out of
ignorance on behalf of the user. If users knew how
easily such behavior could be exploited for malicious
attacks and the true repercussions of such attacks
on the organization, many of them, if not all, would
have desisted from such activities. Curiously, we find
that, at times, dissemination and enforcement work
as substitutes and, at others, as complements.

3.

Model Setup

We consider a sequential game in which the organization first chooses whether or not to implement
a stricter security control and, if it does, the levels
of training and enforcement to accompany this particular control. User training, the level of which is
denoted x, may include but is not limited to [13, 28]:
• seminars and training sessions for the control,
• repeated reminders explaining the control, and
• videos and other links related to the control.
Likewise, y is a proxy for the enforcement level; anticircumvention enforcement measures may include,
among other things [4, 13]:
• physical inspection and monitoring,
• automated (real-time or batch) inspection and
monitoring,
• analysis of users’ activity logs, and
• increasing the penalty level for violations.
Given the organization’s choice of training and
enforcement levels, our users make a decision about
whether they should circumvent the security control. As is customary, we traverse this timeline backwards, starting with the user behavior.

3.1.

User Behavior

We consider a normalized user base of mass one.
We assume that users are heterogeneous and have
different valuations, w, for circumventing a specific
security control. A user who faces a higher level of
inconvenience from a stricter control should have a
higher w. Similarly, a user with a greater urgency to
engage in a prohibited activity—such as visiting a
blocked site—is also likely to have a higher w.
Users are also heterogeneous in the cost or
expected penalty, p, they incur when engaging in
circumvention. There are many aspects that may
appear as a part of this p; we list a few below [17]:
• the expected penalty imposed on the user,
that is, the probability of getting caught times the
penalty on getting caught,
• the cost associated with learning the tricks to
circumvent a specific control, especially when the
control is not easy to bypass, and
Page 5197

• the moral cost in causing real harm to his or her
own organization.
Therefore, a user hw, pi has a net benefit of v = w −
p, and his individual rationality (IR) would dictate
him to circumvent if and only if v > 0. We assume
(see Figure 1):
Assumption 1. The net benefit, v, is uniformly
distributed over an interval [a, b].

Do Not
Circumvent

a

c−y

Circumvent

0

b

v

Figure 1. Users Choose to Circumvent (or Not Circumvent)
Based on Their Net Benefit, v

We expect the eventual distribution of v to depend
on the level of training, x, and the enforcement level,
y. In particular, we let the end points, a and b,
depend on x and y. To understand this dependence,
we look at the underlying mechanism through which
enforcement and training activities manifest themselves in the user’s net benefit, v. As mentioned earlier, standard enforcement activities involve physical
and virtual monitoring and analysis; they essentially
increase the chance of detection [4, 13]. In other
words, when enforcement level increases, the probability for a user to get caught while circumventing
increases. Enforcement activities could also involve
imposing heftier penalties, including a termination
of employment, when caught [27].
Since the expected penalty faced by a user is
the probability of getting caught times the actual
penalty when caught, all in all, higher enforcement
∂p
levels imply a higher expected penalty, ∂y
> 0, and a
correspondingly lower net benefit to all users. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the mean of v,
denoted v̄, decreases with y, that is, ∂∂yv̄ = − ∂p
< 0.
∂y
Accordingly, in Figure 1, we capture this mean as
b
v̄ = a+
= c − y.
2
In contrast, the impact of training on the users’
benefit is not as direct. To understand, we must recognize that a significant component of users’ heterogeneity in v arises out of imperfect or partial information.3 Uninformed or partially informed users
are likely to under- or over-estimate, among other
3
Viewed differently, even if all users had the same value for v
in reality, a lack of perfect information guarantees that they
do not know this true value. Therefore, users with different
levels of (mis-)information would have different perceptions
of v, leading to a distribution around the true value.

things, the real cost borne by the organization, the
difficulty in working with a new security control,
or even the expected penalty imposed by an organization [13, 18, 28]. Now, since training activities
can effectively reduce the information gap and bring
users closer to the mean, v̄, it is logical that training programs ought to reduce the overall variance
in v, by reducing user’s uncertainty (lack of perfect
information) about the true benefit.4 Put differently,
x reduces the spread of the distribution by bringing a and b closer to the mean (without impacting
the mean itself), while y shifts the distribution (and,
hence, only its mean) to the left.5 We assume the
following simple functional forms for a and b:
Assumption 2. The endpoints of interval [a, b]
over which users are distributed are given by:
α
, and
1+x
α
,
b(x, y) = c − y +
1+x

a(x, y) = c − y −

where c < 0 and α > 0 are constants, and c + α >0.
The choice of c < 0 is reasonable. Since c represents the expected value of v for y = 0, a positive
c would imply that a majority of the users find circumventing the control to be so desirable and so
convenient that the control itself is of little value
and the organization is perhaps better off not implementing it in the first place. On the other hand,
we expect α, the parameter that captures the level
of heterogeneity—the spread of the distribution—to
be positive. We also expect b(0, 0) to be positive.
Otherwise, not a single user would engage in circumvention, even if the organization spends nothing on
training and enforcement; the issue of circumvention
then becomes moot. Hence, we only consider those
parameter values for which b(0, 0) = c + α > 0 holds.
We argued earlier that, although information provided during training can reduce the heterogeneity
4

Point to note here is that, although training can reduce the
variance, it cannot completely remove the heterogeneity. This
is because there is also an intrinsic part to users’ heterogeneity. Even when all users have perfect information, they will
exhibit heterogeneous behavior simply because of their intrinsically different preferences.
5

Now, is it at all possible that training also influences the
mean, and enforcement, the variance? Of course, it is possible.
However, as discussed earlier, the primary impact of training ought to be on the variance, and that of enforcement, on
the mean. Our conceptualization, in other words, considers
only the primary impacts of training and enforcement, while
abstracting away the secondary ones in order to avoid confounding factors.
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among users, it can do so only to an extent; it can
never fully eliminate this heterogeneity. An important point to note that our model specification conforms well to this requirement—in our setup, there is
no finite x for which a(x, ·) = b(x, ·), implying that,
for all finite values of x, some level of heterogeneity
does remain.
Clearly, the density function for the net benefit, v,
can be expressed as:
(
α
α
1+x
, if v ∈ [c−y− 1+
, c−y+ 1+
],
x
x
f(v) = 2α
0,
otherwise.
Since we know from users’ individual rationality (IR)
that every user with a v ∈ (0, b] would engage in circumvention, we can easily find the size of this segment as a function of x and y:
s(x, y) = b(x, y) ×

3.2.

1 + x 1 (1 + x)(c − y)
= +
. (1)
2α
2
2α

Organization’s Problem

We assume that the organization’s expected loss
from the loophole it is trying to block using the
stricter control is L; in other words, if there were no
circumvention, implementing the control is worth L
to the organization. However, a portion of this saving is likely to be lost to circumvention; we assume
it to be proportional to the fraction of users circumventing the control and write it as Lµs(x, y), where
µ > 0 is the constant of proportionality and s(x, y)
is as given in (1). Without loss of generality, we can
normalize L to one:
Assumption 3. The net value of the security
control after circumvention is (1 − µs), where µ >
0 represents the relative magnitude of the damage
caused by circumvention.
To complete our model specification, we need to
consider the costs associated with training, x, and
enforcement, y. We assume a standard quadratic
form for both:
Assumption 4. The costs associated with train2
2
ing and enforcement levels x and y are βx2 and γy2 ,
respectively, where β, γ > 0.
Combining all of these, we can write the organization’s decision problem as:


βx2 γy2
(P) max z = 1 − µs(x, y) −
−
,
x,y≥0
2
2
s.t. z ≥ 0 and s(x, y) ≥ 0,
where s(x, y) is as in (1). The constraint z ≥ 0 guarantees that a new security control, along with its

associated training and enforcement, is not deployed
if there is no net benefit from doing so, when compared to doing nothing at all. In other words, if
there are no feasible solutions to (P)—that is, if the
optimal value of the objective function becomes negative without the constraint z ≥ 0—the control is
clearly not worth implementing, and the organization should not pursue it any further. Finally, the
constraint s(x, y) ≥ 0 ensures that, once an organization has eliminated circumvention completely, it
should not want to spend any more on x and y.
It must be noted that the maximization problem
in (P) can also be transformed into a minimization
problem as:


β 0 x2 γ 0 y 2
+
,
(P0) min z 0 = s(x, y) +
x,y≥0
2
2
s.t. µz 0 ≤ 1 and s(x, y) ≥ 0,
where β 0 = βµ and γ 0 = µγ . Although the new formulation in (P0 ) involves fewer parameters in the objective function itself, it turns out that the parameter
µ cannot be eliminated from (P0 ) as µ shows up in
the constraint µz 0 ≤ 1, which is logically equivalent
to z ≥ 0.

4.

Results

When solved, (P) or (P0 ) separates the parameter
space into three distinct regions:
Proposition
1. Let g1 (γ) = γ(2α(γc2 + µ) −
p
µc) − γ(γc2 + 2µ)(2αγc − µ)2 and g2 (γ) = 8α2 γ +
µ2 − 4αγµ(c + α). Further, define:
( 3
µ
, if γ > 2α(cµ+α)
h1 (γ) = 2αg1 (γ )
∞,
otherwise,
( 2
2
µ (2−γc2 −µ)
, if γ > 4α(cµ+µα(µ−2))
g2 (γ )
h2 (γ) =
∞,
otherwise.
Then, the following equilibrium outcomes emerge:
• Circumvention Region: When h1 (γ) ≤ β ≤
h2 (γ), the organization implements the control, but
some users circumvent it.
• No Circumvention Region: When β <
h1 (γ), the control is implemented, and no users circumvent it.
• No Control Region: When β > h2 (γ), the
organization decides not to implement the control.
The result in Proposition 1 is better visualized in
Figure 2. As can be seen from this figure, when
β is small or γ is small, or both, the organization
can effectively eliminate all circumvention by users,
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Figure 2. Relevant Partitions of the (β, γ) Space; α = 2,
µ = 3, c = − 13

either by providing sufficient training or by increasing the level of enforcement, or by using a combination of the two. When β and γ are both high, the
organization simply cannot afford either approach
and decides to not implement the control at all. In
the middle, where β and γ take on moderate values, the control is adopted, along with a combination of training and enforcement; circumvention is
controlled to an extent, but cannot be fully eliminated. Any organization struggling with the issue of
circumvention should belong to this middle region.
We now look at the organization’s optimal choices
of training and enforcement levels:
Proposition 2. The optimal levels of training
and enforcement can be expressed as follows:
• Circumvention Region (h1 (γ) ≤ β ≤ h2 (γ)):
x∗ =

µ(µ − 2cαγ)
, and
4α2 βγ − µ2

y∗ =

µ(2αβ − cµ)
.
4α2 βγ − µ2

• No Circumvention Region (β < h1 (γ)): x∗
is the only real and positive solution of:
αγ(c(1 + x) + α)
− xβ = 0,
(1 + x)3
and y∗ = c + 1+αx∗ .
• No Control Region (β > h2 (γ)): x∗ = y∗ = 0,
trivially.

The results in Proposition 2 are presented in Figure 3. Proposition 2 and Figure 3 tell us an interesting story; they show that both the approaches, training and enforcement, are required for dealing with
circumvention and that neither approach can achieve
it on its own. For any values of β and γ satisfying
β ≤ h2 (γ), both x∗ and y∗ are positive, implying that
it is more effective to use the two approaches in combination, rather than in isolation. In other words,
neither approach dominates the other in preventing
circumvention. Of course, the correct mix depends
on their relative costs, as parameterized by β and γ.
Proposition 3. The optimal level of training,
x∗ , is decreasing in β, and the optimal enforcement
∗
level, y∗ , is decreasing in γ. Mathematically, ∂x
≤0
∂β
∗
∂y
and ∂γ ≤ 0.
The results in Proposition 3 are intuitive. As the
cost for training (or enforcement) goes up, we would
expect to see the organization cutting down on its
level. On the other hand, as the marginal cost goes
down, we should expect the level to increase. These
trends are clearly discernible from Figure 3 as well.
Now, when x∗ is reduced, what happens to y∗ ,
and vice versa? That is, we now turn our attention
to whether x and y act as substitutes or they complement each other. The answer to this question is
curious and is found in our next result:
Proposition 4. The optimal levels of training
and enforcement, x∗ and y∗ , complement each other
in the circumvention region, but they act as substitutes in the no circumvention region. More specifi∗
∗
cally, ∂y
≥ 0 and ∂x
≥ 0 in the no circumvention
∂β
∂γ
∗
∂x∗
region, but ∂y
≤
0
and
≤ 0 in the circumvention
∂β
∂γ
region.
This is counterintuitive. Training and enforcement
are both means to the same end, that is, mitigation
of circumvention. We would naturally expect that
they are substitutes—when one becomes costlier,
we expect it to be reduced with an accompanying
increase in the level of the other. While this intuition remains valid in the no circumvention region,
it no longer holds in the circumvention region, a situation an organization is most likely to find itself in.
In the circumvention region, these two approaches
complement each other. As a result, when β (or γ)
increases, it not only results in a lower x∗ (or y∗ ) but
also in a lower y∗ (or x∗ ). That these two approaches
work hand-in-hand towards fulfilling an organizational goal has important implication for managers
in charge of IT security in their organizations.
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Figure 3. Optimal Levels of Training and Enforcement as Functions of β and γ; α = 2, µ = 3, c = − 13

We now turn our attention to the other parameters in the model. In particular, we are interested in
the impacts of c and α, the parameters that define
the distribution of the users’ net benefit, as well as
that of µ, the parameter representing the severity of
circumvention. To that end, we look at the impact
of these parameters on β = h1 (γ), the boundary that
separates the circumvention region from the no circumvention one.

γ

2

Proposition 5. The circumvention region expands with c and α but shrinks with µ. Mathemati1 (γ )
1 (γ )
1 (γ )
cally, ∂h∂c
≤ 0, ∂h∂α
≤ 0, and ∂h∂µ
≥ 0.
Put differently, when c and α increase, they pull the
boundary between circumvention and no circumvention, β = h1 (γ) in Figure 2, downward or to the left,
thereby widening the region where circumvention
happens. This can be clearly seen in Figure 4, where
the original curve (in black) moves towards the red
and blue curves as α and c increase, α from 2 to 3 and
1
c from − 13 to − 10
, respectively. This result is also
along the expected lines. When c or α increases, it
either moves the distribution to the right or expands
its spread. In either case, b(x, y) moves to the right,
making it costlier for the organization to eradicate
circumvention completely. In contrast, a higher µ
makes user circumvention costlier for the organization, making it less tolerant towards such behavior. The net result is a right or upward shift in the
boundary β = h1 (γ), as shown by the shift to the
green curve in Figure 4 when µ increases from 3 to
5.
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Figure 4. Comparative Statics on the Boundary, β = h1 (γ)

5.

Discussion

Security and assurance of IT have taken the centerstage in an organization’s IT policy and investment
decisions. And, the issue of circumvention has simply added fuel to that fire. Typically, the failure to
secure technology using technology has made organizations throw more money at acquiring even more
technology [23]. Our work shows that such unidimensional approach to security might be pointless.
The role of education and training—creating
awareness among users from different walks—has
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long been recognized [4, 13, 28]. Our work clearly
supports this point of view; we find that organizations are better off heeding this advice and investing
in user training to raise the awareness level about
security policies and their necessity.
What implementable insights do we find? First,
in Proposition 1, we see that there is a significant
portion of the parameter space in which it may be
optimal for the organization to tolerate some level
of circumvention. That certainly explains the situation observed in many organizations today. Facing
higher costs for enforcement and training, organizations often recognize the futility in trying to eradicate circumvention fully. In fact, if the situation is
sufficiently grim, it may be optimal for an organization to not deploy the security control in the first
place.
In Proposition 2, we learn that neither approach
to circumvention dominates the other, and they
work best in combination, not in isolation. In other
words, organizations need not immediately and fully
shift their focus away from enforcement activities
and adopt training as the only circumvention strategy. Circumvention is best addressed when both the
approaches are used in a judicious mix.
Of course, this work, based on a positive modeling
experiment, does not shed much light on what that
judicious mix should constitute, but can certainly
highlight some of its characteristics. Some of these
characteristics are presented in Propositions 3 and 4.
They are largely consistent with our basic understanding of how an organization might strategically
behave in such situations; they give us the confidence
that our setup carries a reasonable resemblance with
the reality.
The most notable of the above characteristics—
the non-monotonicity of x∗ w.r.t. γ or, equivalently,
the non-monotonicity of y∗ w.r.t. β, in Proposition 4—is, however, counterintuitive. And, it also
has a clear, actionable implication. It tells us that
the strategy an organization might undertake in the
face of circumvention can suddenly change once circumvention has been effectively dealt with. When
dealing with user circumvention, an organization
may initially invest in both enforcement and training. However, once it has achieved a full eradication of such behavior among its users, the organization may afterward relent in one of the approaches.
In other words, an organization’s enforcement and
training policies, along with its broader security policies, are likely to evolve with time.
Finally, Proposition 5 tells us how, depending
on the context, an organization’s strategy may

shift between tolerating and not tolerating user circumvention, and whether training and enforcement
should be treated as substitutes or complements of
each other. For example, if a control is inherently
annoying to begin with and most users are seriously
affected, c would be relatively high. In this case,
the boundary h1 (γ) would shift left, making circumvention the likely equilibrium outcome. A good
example of this would be a stringent password policy in an organization where each user is responsible for a number of passwords for logging on to
a number of systems. However, if a single sign-on
technology or key-chain technology is rolled out in
the same organization, the users may no longer be
as annoyed, and c could be low. What is interesting is that, the presence of a single sign-on or key
chain technology could make training and enforcement substitutes for each other although, in their
absence, training and enforcement would likely be
complements. Similarly, one can compare situations
involving different levels of α or µ. If a security control impacts a wide variety of users, we would have
a high α to begin with. On the other hand, if the
control is directed towards one particular group of
employees in a closely knit unit of the organization,
α would be low. There would accordingly be a bearing on the anti-circumvention strategy of the firm.
Thus, Proposition 5, taken together with our other
results, provides a manager in charge of IT security
and assurance a well-rounded understanding of the
issue of circumvention, adding to his ability to tackle
the issue more effectively.

6.

Conclusion

Deliberate circumvention by its user can pose significant security risks to an organization. Our work
shows that investing only in enforcement activities
to mitigate such behavior is futile, if it is not accompanied by proper training and education to increase
the level of awareness among users.
How do our results relate to current industry practices? First, it has long been recognized that technology for the sake of technology does not work,
and creating awareness among users is an important
dimension towards effective security control [3, 4].
Our results seem to echo this sentiment by highlighting the need to have appropriate training programs. In recent times, there has been a growing
recognition among industry professionals of the role
played by user awareness and training. The search
for effective training programs at a lower cost has led
to the development of third-party training materials
and modules—both generic and customized—many
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of which can actually be offered online quite cheaply.
Such developments are well in line with the observation from our modeling experiment.
Our model setup makes certain simplifying
assumptions. For example, we assume that the
impacts of the two approaches, enforcement and
training, on the distribution of users’ net benefit
are very distinct. One impacts the mean, while the
other, the variance. This abstraction is a simplification as, in reality, they both can influence the
mean and variance at the same time. Although we
can speculate how such a generalization might bias
our results, we leave a complete, rigorous analysis to
future research.
Further, we do not consider any budget constraints in dealing with circumvention, while in practice, organizations often contend with limited budget available for investing in enforcement and training. Once again, without proper analysis, it is difficult to speculate how that might impact our results.
Despite these limitations, the purpose of this work
would be amply served if it has succeeded in drawing attention to the need for user training in this
interconnected business environment of today. Perhaps, McGowan [23] is correct when she concludes,
“Institutions cannot hesitate in the goal to educate
their employees.”
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